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 During this lecture, I wish to submit some new avenues for tackling the Taiwan issue. 
By Taiwan issue, I mean the de facto, non de jure, independence of the state in Taiwan. More 
precisely, one can consider that not only politicians but also academics are constantly 
confronted with a kind of Gordian knot intermingling de facto independence, Chinese 
irredentism, third countries’ Realpolitik, Taiwan’s democratization, and last but not least the 
resuming of cross-straits relations and the relocation tide of the island’s industry on the 
mainland. In this paper, I suggest to resort to Michel Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” as an 
“other space” in order to better grasp Taiwan’s uniqueness in the international society, on the 
one hand, the processes at work in the latter, on the other hand.  
 
 I shall only present some outlines: many examples, references, and demonstrations 
should be added. Similarly, as I am presenting it in front of an audience that is well informed 
both of Taiwan’s history and of contemporary political developments, I have not recalled 
many processes, which should otherwise be essential. For the same reason, I shall often use in 
an interchangeable way Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC), Republic of China on Taiwan, the 
 2
island, on the one hand, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China, the mainland, on the 
other hand, though nuances should of course be introduced.  
 
 Finally, by way of introducing this lecture, I need to say that it is based on two 
underlying hypothesis, that I shall not discuss here. The first one is that the Westphalian 
system – that is a juxtaposition of sovereign states – is still operational, though it should not 
be forgotten that it is a fiction. The second one is that globalization is not leading to a 
borderless world, but quite the contrary, that nation-states are a product of globalization1
 
Taiwan as “an other space” 
 
 As a geopolitical entity, Taiwan is all the more difficult to conceptualize as the 
exceptional does not lie where one would expect to find it. For this very reason, I suggest to 
resort to Michel Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” as an “other space”2: Taiwan would be 
the heterotopia of the interstate society, of the Westphalian society, which more than any 
other is indeed characterized by the site. Though I am not opposing works which resort to this 
concept for problematizing entities that are not territorial units3, I precisely wish in this paper 
to apply it to a geopolitical entity that is “territorialized”4.  
                                                 
1 Among many works, see Jean-François Bayart, Le gouvernement du monde: Une critique politique de la 
globalisation, Paris, Fayard, 2004, in particular chapter 2, “L’Etat, produit de la globalisation”, pp. 53-132 ; 
English translation : Global Subjects: A Political Critique of Globalization, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007, 
chapter 2, “The State : A Product of Globalization”, pp. 30-82.  
 
2 “Hétérotopie” in French: Michel Foucault, “Des espaces autres”, Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité, n° 5, 
October 1984, pp. 46-49 (now available in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988 (volume II, 1976-1988), Paris, Gallimard, 
2001, pp. 1571-1581) ; translated into English by Jay Miskowiec : “Of Other Spaces”, Diacritics, volume 16, n° 
1, Spring 1986, pp. 22-27. Written in Tunisia in 1967, this text was the basis of a lecture given by Michel 
Foucault at the “Cercle d’études architecturales” on 14 March 1967. Foucault granted his permission to publish 
this text in the spring of 1984 only. This paper refers to the English translation published by Diacritics with 
reference to the French original in Dits et écrits given in brackets. 
 
3 William A. Callahan has resorted to this concept in his book: Contingent States: Greater China and 
Transnational Relations, Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press (Borderlines Series, volume 
22), 2004. For Callahan “Foucault’s notion of ‘heterotopia’ is usefull (…) for problematizing the unified notions 
of civilization and power that mainstream Greater China discourse asserts.” (p. 21). And he adds: “Greater China, 
then, is better understood as a heterotopia than as a geopolitical entity. Rather than territorial units, it is 
composed of highly mobile populations, involved in contradictions and contestations about identity, community, 
and civilization.” (p. 22); and farther: “I have appealed to Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, which describes a 
decentered space/time. Rather than follow many who seek to define Chinese nationalism as either utopic or 
dystopic, I have addressed the contingency of Greater China and East Asian international relations through an 
analysis of the discursive economies of four overlapping narratives of civilization/barbarism – nativism, 
conquest, conversion, diaspora – to say something, but not to claim to say everything. As the book has shown, 
the point is not to find one true answer, but to examine how politics is produced in the interplay between 
narrative modes. Greater China is not a place; it is a bundle of concepts.” (p. 221, emphasis in the original). 
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 Foucault has thus shown how the hierarchic ensemble of places of the Middle Ages 
had been replaced by an infinite, and infinitely open space with Galileo, which, in turn, has 
been replaced in our epoch by a space that takes the form of relations among sites5.  
 
“Today the site has been substituted for extension which itself had 
replaced emplacement. (…) we live inside a set of relations that 
delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not 
superimposable on one another.”6  
 
And, among all sites, Foucault is taking interest in particular ones: 
 
“(...) I am interested in certain ones that have the curious property of 
being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to 
suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to 
designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as it were, which are 
linked with all the others, which however contradict all the other sites, 
are of two main types.”7
 
As a matter of fact, Taiwan can be considered as a textbook case as regard to Foucault’s 
demonstration, as these two main types – utopias and heterotopias – have succeeded one 
another since 1949. 
 
 The post-1949 nationalist project was doubly utopian: it was wholly centred around an 
overweening project – that of the recovery of the mainland -, and, for this very purpose, it was 
banking on the transformation of Taiwan into a “conservatoire”, an academy of “China”, 
China being itself reified as the “Eternal China” in order to better oppose the “New 
Communist China”. In concrete terms, it led not only to the suppression of any form of local 
characteristics – in religious or dialectal forms for instance -, but also to a toponymy 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 For other works related to political science resorting to Foucault’s “heterotopia”: Heriberto Cairo, “The Field of 
Mars: heterotopias of territory and war”, Political Geography, n° 23, 2004, pp. 1009-1036; Charles Burdett, 
“Journeys to the other spaces of Facist Italy”, Modern Italy, vol. 5, n° 1, May 2000, pp. 7-23; Georgi Fotev, 
“Heterotopias of the Transition: The Bulgarian Case”, Polish Sociological Review, n° 133, 2001, pp. 29-32; 
David A. Martin, “Building Heterotopia: Realism, Sovereignty, and Development in the Ecuadoran Amazon”, 
Alternatives, vol. 24, n°1, January-March, 1999, pp. 59-81. 
 
5 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, art. cit., pp. 22 and 23 (1572). 
 
6 Ibid., p. 23 (1572 and 1574). 
 
7 Ibid., p. 24 (1574). Emphasis added. 
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overwhelmingly and for the very purpose of preserving “Eternal China” dedicated to an 
“elsewhere”. “Beiping Lu” (Beiping Road) for instance being an apposite example of this 
elsewhere contradicting the reality, as the city once named Beiping (the peace of the north)8 
had already been renamed Beijing (the capital of the north) by the regime controlling the site 
of the city and was referred as such by its inhabitants. In so doing, the nationalist regime was 
asking Taipei dwellers to indefinitely move about in a fictitious China. A counter example of 
the naming of a street that sticks to political changes is given in Paris where the “Rue de 
Leningrad” (Leningrad Street) was renamed “Rue de Saint-Petersbourg” (Saint Petersburg 
Street) after the name of the Russian Baltic city was changed in 1991 to its original one.9
 
 But most interestingly, the democratic transition in the late 1980s and in the 1990s has 
transformed Taiwan’s site from a utopia into a heterotopia in Foucault’s sense.  
 
“There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real 
places – places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding 
of society – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of 
effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites 
that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, 
contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, 
even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. 
Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that 
they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to 
utopias, heterotopias.”10
 
Because of the entanglement of a claimed sovereignty limited to the territory the régime is in 
control of, and the fact that the official – though not internationally recognized – borders are 
still those of the 1947 constitution, Taiwan meets the principles of the heterotopology outlined 
in “Of other spaces”.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In 1928 when the nationalist régime moved the capital to Nanjing. 
 
9 In fact the changes of the Parisian street’s name have been the following : “rue de Saint-Petersbourg” up until 
1914, than, according to the change in 1914 of Saint Petersburg into Petrograd, “rue de Petrograd”, but it was not 
until 1945 that it became “rue de Leningrad” though it was in 1924 that the Soviets had renamed Petrograd into 
Leningrad. 
 
10 Ibid. (1574 and 1575). Emphasis added. 
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First principle 
 
“Its first principle is that there is probably not a single culture in the 
world that fails to constitute heterotopias.”11  
 
Taiwan would be the Westphalian society’s heterotopia. And in the distinction made 
by Foucault at this point of his reasoning between crisis heterotopias and heterotopias of 
deviation12, Taiwan should be placed in the first category. Though, Foucault notes that crisis 
heterotopias are disappearing today, by no means does Taiwan meets the criteria of the second 
category: “(…) those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the 
required mean or norm (…)”13. Thus, Taiwan is not a “deviant” state within the interstate 
community: it is a sovereign state as defined by international law (i.e. bringing together its 
three constituent elements that are a population, a territory, and a political authority), it 
conforms to the rules of international law, it is a rich country spending a substantial part of its 
budget to humanitarian, food and development aid, and, last but not least, it is a democracy. 
But we are facing a crisis heterotopia, the crisis resulting both from a civil war that is 
uncompleted but that is no longer claimed as such by the ruling party, and from the 
discrepancy between de facto and de jure independence.  
 
Second principle 
 
“The second principle (…) is that a society, as its history unfolds, can 
make an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion; for 
each heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a 
society and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of 
the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another.”14
 
Would there not have been the extension of the cold war to Asia, the ROC on Taiwan 
would not have survived, and Taiwan as a separate political entity from China would not have 
existed. But with the end of the cold war, Taiwan still has a precise and determined function 
within the new world order dominated by the United States. Thus, Washington’s China policy, 
                                                 
11 Ibid. (1575). 
 
12 Ibid., pp. 24 and 25 (1575 and 1576). 
 
13 Ibid., p. 25 (1576). 
 
14 Ibid. 
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and to some extent Tokyo’s one, rests on the so-called Taiwan card which, as such, means 
maintaining the status quo in the Formosa Straits: preventing Taiwan to become a de jure 
independent state, but preventing China to put an end to Taiwan’s de facto independence by 
helping Taiwan to defend itself against the PRC’s military threat. Within the line of reasoning 
I try to develop here, the United States policy boils down to maintaining Taiwan as an “other 
space”, a heterotopia, of the Westphalian society. 
 
Third principle 
 
“The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place 
several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible.”15
 
One apposite example is certainly the issue at stake surrounding the National Palace 
Museum in terms of Taiwan’s national identity, in terms of Taipei’s diplomacy, as well as in 
terms of Beijing’s Taiwan policy16. The museum was opened in Beijing in 1925 within the 
Forbidden City Wall, and the further the nationalists lost ground to the communists, Chiang 
Kai-shek ordered the moving of the main part of the collections. This moving was organized 
both as a matter of priority as early as 1948 and in secret. The new National Palace Museum 
built in northern Taipei was opened in 1965. As a matter of fact, the island of Taiwan holds 
none of the Chinese culture’s stereotypes, be they monuments (the Great Wall or the 
Forbidden City), historic sites (the Emperors’ tombs), or natural sites (the Yangtze River or 
the Yellow River Basin) as Horng-luen Wang aptly remarks17. Quite the contrary, Taiwan in 
1949 held either temples indicating that the island’s folk religion was more than less a 
“decentralized religion”18 mostly stemming from Fujian, either foreign monuments inherited 
from former colonizers. The National Palace Museum was thus a powerful legitimizing tool 
for the utopian nationalist project.  
                                                 
15 Ibid. (1577). 
 
16 The story of the National Palace Museum and its legitimizing role in the post-1949 nationalist project are well 
known. See, among others, Françoise Mengin, Trajectoires chinoises: Taipei, Hong Kong et Pékin, Paris, 
Karthala (coll. Recherches internationales), 1998, pp. 25 and 26. But this issue has never been better set out than 
by Horng-luen Wang in his article “National Culture and Its Discontents: The Politics of Heritage and Language 
in Taiwan, 1949-2003”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 46, n° 4, October 2004, pp. 793-797.  
 
17 Ibid., pp. 795 and 796. 
 
18 Robert P. Weller, “Identity and Social Change in Taiwanese Religion”, in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: 
A New History, Armonk and London, M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 340. 
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 But with the so-called indigenization (bentuhua) of the Republic of China in the late 
1980s and the 1990s, and even more so with the election of the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, in 2000, the National Palace Museum’s 
collections and the debates they arouse both in terms of property rights, as well as in terms of 
diplomacy tool, turn them into this object of contestation proper to a heterotopia and that 
inverts the set of relations that it happens to designate, mirror, or reflect. Taiwan 
independence activists’ stance – these collections have been stolen by Chiang Kai-shek and 
should be returned to the PRC19 – is closely akin, but up to a certain point only, to both that of 
the nationalists (Guomindang) and that of the communists. Taiwan independence activists 
meet communists and nationalists in as much as for all three parties this museum represents, 
symbolizes “China”, but they depart from each other when designating China as well as its 
borders: the Republic of China limited to Taiwan and its offshore islands for the nationalists, 
the People’s Republic of China of which Taiwan is part of for the communists, the People’s 
Republic of China of which Taiwan is not part of for the Taiwan independence activists. In 
addition, and still when focusing on the ownership debate, the PRC’s stance being far more 
ambivalent than it seems at first glance confirms that the National Palace Museum is indeed 
this object of contestation proper to a heterotopia. Though the PRC government considers that 
the museum’s collections have been stolen by Chiang Kai-shek, it does not claim their return 
in order not to meet the Taiwan independence activists’ stance, and in so doing legitimize 
Taiwan independence.  
 
 The same conclusion can be reached as to the debates aroused by the use of the 
museum’s collections as a diplomatic tool20. In spite of the cultural policy promoted under 
Chen Shui-bian that seeks to a “de-sinisation” (qu zhongguo hua) of Taiwan, the President has 
not neglected, as his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, to break Taiwan’s international isolation by 
using the collections as a “showcase” abroad. In the context of the pan-blue/pan-green 
(fanlan/fanlü) partisan divide21, it is this time on the very domestic arena that the National 
Palace Museum as a “national” symbol is not only emblematic of a contested or inverted 
                                                 
19 See, Wang, “National Culture and Its Discontents …”, art. cit., p. 793 and p. 795. 
 
20 For these debates see ibid., pp. 794 and 795. 
 
21 Blue is the colour of the Guomindang allied to small parties openly advocating reunification with mainland 
China; green is the colour of the DPP allied with Taiwan Solidarity Union openly advocating independence.  
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relationship but of an object which meaning is “neutralised” in Foucault’s own words. Indeed, 
such exhibitions are sharply criticized both by Taiwan independence activists who consider 
that they are not representative of Taiwan’s culture and by those in the pan-blue camp 
opposing independence and, as such, criticizing a DPP government for using “Chinese” 
symbols to promote Taiwan as an independent state on the international arena.  
  
Fourth principle 
 
“Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time – which is to say 
that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, 
heterochronies.”22
 
At this point, Foucault distinguishes “heterotopias that are linked to the accumulation 
of time” from temporal heterotopia “those linked, on the contrary, to time in its most fleeting, 
transitory, precarious aspect, to time in the mode of the festival.”23 Within this distinction, 
Taiwan certainly meets the criteria of the first category, even though the examples given by 
Foucault – museums and libraries – seem far from a state. But if one looks closely at the way 
aboriginal peoples as well as aboriginal cultures have been put to the forefront of Taiwan’s 
cultural policy during democratization, and more generally the rediscovery process associated 
to the development of each sub-ethnic community’s culture and of each layer of Taiwan’s 
history, the new cultural policy and the national identity formation process boil down to the 
examples given by Foucault. “Museums and libraries have become heterotopias in which time 
never stops building up and topping its own summit, whereas in the seventeenth century, even 
at the end of the century, museums and libraries were the expression of an individual 
choice.”24 If one spins out the metaphor of the museums and libraries, the sinisation (hanhua) 
of the island population under the authoritarian years of the nationalist regime, and, in 
particular, the legitimizing role played by the National Palace Museum can be ascribed to the 
“expression of an individual choice” that of Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi) plan to recover 
the mainland. On the contrary, the de-sinisation (qu zhongguo hua) process underlying the 
cultural policy of the DPP partakes in transforming Taiwan into a laboratory – hence a 
showcase or a museum – of hybridity: a multicultural society that, moreover, asserts its 
                                                 
22 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, art. cit., p. 26 (1578). 
 
23 Ibid. (1578 and 1579). 
 
24 Ibid. (1578). 
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multiple colonial past (Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese). Taiwan’s nation-state building is not 
making a clean sweep of its past25 , but quite the contrary, a process of recollecting and 
displaying all the “slices” of its history. 
 
 More generally, the building of Taiwan’s new national culture carries out an inversion 
of the hierarchy between “national culture” and “local cultures” in as much as Chinese culture 
is considered as one of the many elements partaking of the hybrid Taiwanese culture. As far 
as languages are concerned, the decision made by the Cabinet in 2007 to promote a National 
languages development bill (guojia yuyan fazhan fa) recognizing all local languages as 
national languages26 is but one more example of such a process of inversion. In Foucault’s 
view: 
 
“(…) the idea of accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of 
general archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, 
all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is 
itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of 
organizing in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation 
of time in an immobile place, this whole idea belongs to our 
modernity.”27
 
 Certainly, globalization produces all over the world a twofold process of compression 
of time and space, on the one hand, and of “reinvention of the difference”28, on the other hand, 
and in this process Taiwan can be considered as very commonplace. In addition, that the 
nation-state is a product of globalization has been thoroughly demonstrated29. However, this 
process carries a strong political significance in Taiwan which is to resist the PRC’s 
irredentism, or, to put it in another way, to secure the building of a nation-state in which the 
“Chinese” component is just but one. As very well put by Horng-luen Wang: 
 
                                                 
25 I am referring here to the third line of the first stanza of the French socialist song L’Internationale (The 
Internationale) which says “Du passé faisons table rase” which means “Lets put the past behind us”. The English 
version is: “Away with all our superstitions,”; and  the Chinese one  “Jiu shijie da ge luohualiushui” (The old 
world shall be destroyed like fallen petals and splashed water). 
 
26 Taipei Times, 26 March 2007, p. 8. 
 
27 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, art. cit., p. 26 (1578). 
 
28 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twenteith Century Ethnograpy, Literature and Art, Cambridge 
(Mass.), Havard University Press, p. 15. 
 
29 See above in this paper footnote n° 1. 
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“(…) ‘cultural heterogeneity and hybridity’, rather than ‘cultural 
homogeneity and authenticity’, are currently recognized as another 
defining characteristic of Taiwanese culture. The penetration of global 
cultural flows has given such an argument a stronger hold, and it is 
through the deliberate articulation (of the global and the national) that 
TI nationalists intend to construct a new identity that can be 
distinguished from China not only politically but also culturally.”30
 
Fifth principle 
 
“Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that 
both isolates them and makes them penetrable.” 31
 
 It is now well known that Taiwan’s population is highly mobile. From the early 1970s 
on, the majority of the elite has been trained in foreign universities, mostly in North-America. 
Above all, the relocation tide of the Taiwanese industry on the mainland that begun in the 
1980s and has since then been steadily growing forces many businessmen or women, if not to 
commute, at least to often travel in and out the island. But, whether it is a matter of 
procedures or a matter of route, these flows must take a detour, indeed go through an airlock. 
 
 As to procedures, visas are granted through a substitute border, that is a foreign 
consulate. Likewise, the various bureaucratic harassment travelers holding a passport from the 
Republic of China (ROC) are confronted with leads those of them who are frequently 
traveling to adopt a substitute nationality, that is to obtain – purchase – another passport. But, 
above all, the logic which governs bureaucratic harassment leads to an inversion of the 
hierarchy, proper to a heterotopia, between the recognized state (the PRC) and the non-
recognized one (the ROC). Either the Taiwanese holding the “Republic of China” passport is 
suspected to carry a faked Chinese passport 32 ; either, and most often, the Taiwanese is 
suspected of being a Chinese carrying a faked “Republic of China” passport as Taiwanese 
travelers are less involved in trafficking and have a stronger purchasing power33.  
                                                 
30 Horng-luen Wang, “Rethinking the Global and the National: Reflections on National Imaginations in Taiwan”, 
Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 17, n° 4, 2000, p. 103. TI refers to Taiwan Independence. 
 
31 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, art. cit., p. 26 (1579). 
 
32 Horng-luen Wang, “ Regulating Transnational Flows of People : An Institutional Analysis of Passports and 
Visas as a Regime of Mobility”, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, n° 11,  p. 362. 
 
33 Ibid., p. 363. 
 
sociétés politiques comparées, n°7, septembre 2008 
http://www.fasopo.org 
 
 11
 
 As to routes, the crucial issue is the lack of direct links (san tong), in particular direct 
regular flights, between Taiwan and the mainland34. The Sino-Taiwanese border is both an 
open border as testified by the relocation tide of the island’s industry on the mainland, and a 
closed border as testified by the necessity for people and goods to follow indirect routes and 
go through an airlock, generally Hong Kong or Macao. As for passengers, such a detour 
amounts to a waste of time and, of course, to higher costs. 
 
 As well known, Taipei refuses the opening of direct regular flights as long as Beijing 
insists on describing them as “Chinese domestic flights”, at the very least as “cross-straits 
flights”, but in any case “international flights”. But, beyond the legal issue, what is at stake is 
the very reunification of the Taiwanese population as part of it spends more time on the 
mainland than on the island. More, it is the re-foundation of the basic social institution, the 
family, which is at stake as not only are many families separated on a long-term basis, but it is 
well documented now that many Taiwanese businessmen (or women) are having affairs or 
even are starting a new family on the mainland. 
 
Sixth principle 
 
“The last trait of heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to 
all the space that remains. This function unfolds between two extreme 
poles. Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes 
every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, 
as still more illusory (…). Or else, on the contrary, their role is to 
create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as 
meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and 
jumbled.”35
 
And Foucault calls this latter type the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation36. 
Considering Taiwan’s history since it has been separated from China, that is since the 1895 
Shimonoseki Treaty, it can be argued that Taiwan has always been asked to perform a kind of 
                                                 
34 The opening, on 4 July 2008, of week-end cross-strait charter flights has not put an end to this issue. These 
flights are not regular flights: they are limited charter flights and, if they skip the usual stopovers in Hong Kong 
or other transit points, they still have to fly over one of them.  
 
35 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, art. cit., p. 27 (1580). 
 
36 Ibid. 
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showcase role: first a showcase of Japan’s colonialism during fifty years, then a showcase of 
the so-called Free world during the Cold war. A contrario, the four years (1945-1949) during 
which Taiwan was under Mainland China direct administration have been marked by the so-
called 28 February (er erba) massacre in 1947. Today, the fully-fledge democracy 
implemented on Taiwan is one rhetorical argument put forward by Western diplomats in order 
to maintain their strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis China.  
 
Specific Practices Reflected by Taiwan’s International Integration 
 
 Following Foucault’s reasoning should lead us to consider Taiwan as a “mirror” to 
scrutinize contemporary international practices, logics, and processes. Non-recognition does 
not mean autarchy, and, indeed, Taiwan is fully integrated into the international society. First, 
the substitutes to diplomatic and consular relations which have been devised between Taiwan 
and states recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan indicate that the rule of the game is 
still the Westphalian fiction, though through a logic of pretence. Second, the relocation tide of 
Taiwan’s industry on the mainland - a case in point of globalization processes - produces 
inverted logics. 
 
Resorting to Legal Fictions to Deal with Fictitious Borders 
 
 Since 1949, the borders of the state in Taiwan are fictitious. After 1949, that is after 
the nationalist régime had moved to Taiwan, the borders of the Republic of China were still 
those designated in the 1947 constitution (thus including the mainland), which, as said by the 
constitution, can only be modified by a resolution of the National Assembly. As a matter of 
fact, no such resolution has been adopted since 1949. These fictitious borders have still been 
recognized by the majority of the members of the interstate community up until the 1970s. 
Because of the cold war, determination to oppose communism led the majority of 
governments not only to back a widely discredited régime, but also to recognize it as the sole 
legal government of the whole of China, of which in fact it controlled only a territory two 
hundred times smaller than the one controlled by the communist government. However, 
coming to some arrangements proved to be necessary from the outset. Among several 
examples: in 1952, article 4 of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty (signed between the Republic 
of China and Japan) limited the “national territory” to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen (Jinmen), and 
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Matsu (Mazu), while in 1954, the Sino-American defense treaty restricted the “national 
territory” to Taiwan and Penghu.  
 
 But, when during the 1970s, the interstate community adopted, with a few exceptions, 
the principle of effective rule – i.e. recognizing the government that controls the vast majority 
of the country’s territory -, one fiction was substituted for another, since it promised to 
recognize the unity of the nation and the sovereignty of the newly recognized government 
over an island which was still outside its control. Therefore, the original fiction turned out to 
be reversible.  
 
 As a technique for resolving antinomies, legal fictions are not absent from 
international law. As recognition is a discretionary act left to the appraisal of each sovereign 
state, each state is able “to refuse to recognise reality, considering it to be impossible to 
oppose, or to recognise the unreal, considering it to exist”37. But, beyond the question of state 
recognition, development of relations with Taiwan, initially confined to the private sphere, 
brought about new legal paradoxes which were, in turn, resolved by recourse to fictions. The 
same device was applied to acts that went against the fiction of the Beijing government being 
the government of the whole of China. Secondary fictions were grafted onto the main one. In 
their case it is the objective reality, not the legal consequences of that reality, which is denied. 
Para-diplomatic representative offices are considered as mere private associations; visas are 
issued under the seal of another consulate; serving ministers do not travel in that capacity; 
arms supplies (in the case of the French deals) are presented as simple contracts between two 
civil enterprises although the procedure for sale of military material involving government 
boddies – even a decision of the then head of state, François Mitterrand – has in fact been 
applied; bilateral negotiations are conducted by senior officials, presented as mere experts, 
with aim of signing an agreement concerning two governments but in fact linking two private 
enterprises38. A logic of pretence has been established.  
 
                                                 
37 Jean J. A. Salmon, “Le procédé de la fiction en droit international public” in C. Perelman and P. Foriers (eds), 
Les présomptions et les fictions en droit, Brussels, Emile Bruylant, 1974, p. 126. 
 
38 For a more in-depth analysis of this process, see Françoise Mengin, “A Functional Relationship: Political 
Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties”, The China Quarterly, n° 169, March 2002, pp. 136-153, and “A 
pretence of privatisation: Taiwan’s external relations”, in Béatrice Hibou (ed.), Privatising the State, London, 
Hurst, 2004, pp. 147-167. 
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In contrast, the relations – embryonic ones, certainly – that some chancelleries have 
maintained with so-called national liberation movements suggest a process of state 
recognition that may or may not come about 39 . But relations with Taiwan have led to 
unofficial or substitutive normalization, establishing inter-state relations without state 
recognition. This case is sui generis, but, in fact, relations have followed an entirely classical 
pattern, though in fictional space. To deal with an exceptional situation there was, in this case, 
no change in the machinery for regulation of inter-state society; no original arrangements 
were devised, except for recourse to a dilatory system making it possible to hide the state 
dimension while preserving its dynamics. While this new arrangement is based on a process 
of fiction, and its motives are exclusively economic – governments not recognizing the 
Republic of China are eager to promote their firms’ interests in Taiwan -, it all relates to the 
national interest as most realistically understood40.  
 
 Far from leading to effective normalization, systematic recourse to legal fictions has 
had the aim of hiding the existence of a state, not abolishing it or changing it – which could, 
over time, have raised the question of its recognition. So the development of Taiwan’s foreign 
relations has occurred tangentially, since each additional “arrangement” has aimed to keep 
Taiwan out of the community of nations. So, instead of coining Taiwan as a “quasi-state”, I 
suggest the wording “non-state”, as the state in Taiwan (i.e. the Republic of China on Taiwan) 
is a state as testified, in particular, by the classical pattern of its external relations relying on 
pseudo-diplomatic and consular institutions but aiming at keeping Taiwan out of the interstate 
community. Rather than a non recognized state, Taiwan is a recognized non-state. Therefore, 
the rule of game, and Taiwan - though unique - is no exception at this level, is still the 
Westphalian fiction, that is a juxtaposition of sovereign states (even if Taiwan de jure 
sovereignty is not recognized).  
 
The Inverted Logics Produced by Sino-Taiwanese Exchanges 
 
 In order to better understand the relationship between Taiwan and China, I shall resort 
to the patterns of political spaces Etienne Balibar has indicated to represent European 
                                                 
39 One thinks particularly of Western states’ relations with the PLO. 
 
40 As understood in the so-called classical or realist theory of international relations, the idea of the national 
interest refers not only to the security of a state or its rank, but also to the economic or social well-being of its 
population considered as a whole. 
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borders41. Among the four conflicting patterns which are “opposite ways of ‘constituting’ 
Europe (or, possibly, resisting its constitution)” 42  he distinguishes the Center-Periphery 
pattern - relying on both Immanuel Wallerstein’s and Fernand Braudel’s works -43, and the 
Cross-over pattern, that is “overlapping folds”44, or nappes superposées45.  
 
 Though Balibar suggests that one should wonder whether the center-periphery pattern 
has not always been profoundly “Eurocentric”46, and points to the fact that one privileged 
field where it is continuously applied in today’s scientific and political debate is precisely the 
field of “European construction”, he also hints that other concentric structures are forming 
though not equally advanced as Europe, that in other parts of the world one can detect 
hierarchical economic-political combinations, and that the reproduction at the regional level  
of dependency relationships between the core and the periphery may suggest that a new 
episode of “struggle in the core” is now beginning, where Europe rivals other “central” 
powers, the U. S. but also the Far East47. I suggest to keep in mind these patterns when 
analyzing Taiwan’s border with China in the context of the relocation tide of Taiwan’s 
industry on the mainland and, in so doing, I would like to show how “inverted logics” are at 
work, logics that run counter to the general trend. In other words, and to go back to Foucault’s 
approach of “other spaces”, the interdependent Sino-Taiwanese borderland “mirrors” and 
“reflects” the globalizing world as center-periphery and overlapping folds patterns, but 
produces inverted effects.  
 
                                                 
41 Etienne Balibar, “Europe, pays des frontières”, chapter V in Europe Constitution Frontière, Bègles, Editions 
du Passant (coll. Poches de résistance), 2005, pp. 94-164. This chapter is the edited version of The Alexander 
von Humboldt lecture in Human Geography Etienne Balibar gave, in English, on November 10, 2004, at the 
University of Nijmegen and which was titled “Europe as Borderland”. This paper refers to the paper of the 
conference with reference to the book published in French given in brackets. 
 
42 Ibid., p. 10 (105). 
 
43 Ibid., pp. 17 and 18 (116 and 117). 
 
44 Ibid., pp. 21 and 22 (123-125). 
 
45 The two others being the Clash-of-Civilizations pattern, and the Global Network pattern. 
 
46 “(...) even when it was meant to reverse the traditional European (colonialist) view of history, where Europe 
was the only site of decisive historical processes, and even if the historic center of the World System has 
progressively moved from Europe itself to ‘New Europe’, i.e. the ‘White’ colonies of Northern America and 
Australia.” Ibid., p. 18 (118). Emphasis in the original. 
 
47 Ibid., p. 18 (117 and 118). 
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Certainly, since the resuming of Sino-Taiwanese links in the mid 1980s and the 
relocation tide of Taiwan’s industry on the mainland, one witnesses not so much the rise of 
what as been coined either a “natural economic territory”48, or a “region-state”49 testifying to 
the primacy of economic interests over national identification, but at least a new division of 
labor, and the formation of an interdependent borderland. Such a process does not forecast the 
fading of borders, but quite the contrary bears witness to a differential constitutive of the 
border. In other words, the mere existence of borders – be it between countries, systems, or 
administrative entities – bring about differences that in turn produce wealth through trade, 
investment, migration, smuggling, social differentiation, and thus new power relations50.  
 
At this stage of the reasoning, what is important to keep in mind is that the differential 
concealed in the Sino-Taiwanese border and which has given impetus to the relocation tide 
implied a hierarchy with Taiwan being the most advanced economy compared to that of the 
mainland. Such a hierarchy, such a new concentric division, implies compensatory migration 
as well as a new gradation in the setting of who is the “étranger”, this French word 
encompassing the twofold sense of “foreigner” and “stranger”. It just so happens that if one 
considers the logic of governmentality in Taiwan, that in Foucaldian terms closely relates 
managing of the population with security considerations51, the issue at stake is not so much 
that of “illegal immigrants” in Taiwan – even though the question has arisen – but that of 
“illegal migrants” or, not to play with words, that of a “deserting population”. Indeed, as well 
known, this relocation tide on the mainland was a “society-led” investment flow, while the 
government in Taipei has striven to slow it down both by maintaining restrictive regulations 
and by offering incentives to encourage other destinations to the relocation tide in particular 
in South-East Asia with the so-called “southward policy” (nanxiang zhengce). Yet,  
                                                 
48 Robert A. Scalapino, in Jane Khana (ed.), Southern China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan : Evolution of a 
Subregional Economy, Washington, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Issues Series, 
vol. XVII, n° 7, 1995, p. viii. 
 
49 Kenechi Omae, “The Rise of the Region State”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, n° 2, Spring 1993, pp. 78-87; The 
Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace, London, Harper Collins, 1994 (2nd edition); 
and The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies, London, Harper Collins, 1996. 
 
50 See Françoise Mengin and Jean-Louis Rocca, “Analyzing Changes through Overlapping Sheres”, in Françoise 
Mengin and Jean-Louis Rocca (eds), Politics in China: Moving Frontiers, New York and Houndmills 
(Basingstoke), Palgrave Macamillan, 2002, pp. x-xxv, and Françoise Mengin, “Taiwanese Politics and the 
Chinese Market: Business’s Part in the Formation of a State, of the Border as a Stake of Negotiations”, ibid., pp. 
232-257. 
 
51 See Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With 
two lectures by and and interview with Michel Foucault, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 25. 
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Taiwanese investments on the mainland have kept on rising, while many firms do not declare 
their investments to Taiwan’s administration in order to escape the regulations (in particular, 
many listed companies make investment through their overseas subsidiaries in order to keep 
away from the whole approval process 52 ). Therefore the relocation tide derives from 
autonomous actions from the business community, and the Taipei government regulating 
action remains very marginal, leading Leng Tse-kang to write that cross-Straits economic 
relations are characterized by “civilian governance”53. In addition, in order to avoid restrictive 
regulations limiting Chinese talent flows in Taiwan, many Taiwanese firms prefer to establish 
their own research and development teams on the mainland54. Above all, because of the 
refusal by Taipei authorities to open up direct regular links, Taiwanese people (especially 
businessmen – Taishang - but also families) are more and more settling down in China, 
particularly in Shanghai or in the Shanghai region (Da Shanghai). Available figures are an 
indicator of this trend all the more so as it is acknowledged that actual figures can reach twice 
the formers. For instance, it is reported that, in 2002, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
Taiwanese elites were living in China at any time55, and that, in early 2007, Taiwanese that 
had settled in the Shanghai metropolitan area alone amounted to 500,00056.  
 
When examining the relationship between this emigrated population and Taiwanese 
authorities a few general features are salient, notwithstanding all the individual 
counterexamples. Both by force and by choice, the Taipei government can hardly support 
Taishang’s activities on the mainland. By force, the Taiwanese state has no institutions in 
China, and even Taiwan banks cannot support financially Taiwanese investments. But, above 
                                                 
52 See, among others, Yun-han Chu, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 6, n° 15, 1997, p. 242, and footnote n° 31. 
 
53 Tse-Kang Leng, “Sovereignty at Bay? Business Networking and Domestic Politics of Informal Integration 
between Taiwan and Mainland China”, in Philippe Régnier and Fu-kuo Liu (eds), Regionalism in East Asia: 
Paradigm Shifting?, London, Curzon and Routledge, 2004, p. 177; and “Securing Cross-Straits Economic 
Relations: New Challenges and Opportunities”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 11, n°31, April 2002, p. 
267. 
 
54 Tse-Kang Leng, “Economic Globalization and IT Talent Flows across the Taiwan Straits: the 
Taipei/Shanghai/Silicon Valley Triangle”, Asian Survey, vol. 42, n° 2, 2002, p. 21; and “Global Networking and 
the New Division of Labor Across the Taiwan Straits”, in Françoise Mengin (ed.), Cyber China: Reshaping 
National Identities in the Age of Information, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 192-197. 
 
55 Chen-min Chao, “National Securitys. Economic Interests: reassessing Taiwan’s mainland policy under Chen 
Shui-bian”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 13, n° 41, November 2004, p. 697. 
 
56 Chang, Chiung-fang, (Zhang Qiong-fang), “Taiwan nüren de xin shangai meng” (Taiwan women and their 
new Shanghai dream), Taiwan Guanghua (Taiwan Panorama), vol. 32, n° 3, March 2007, p. 85.  
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all, as the Taishang are constantly escaping (Taiwanese) governmental regulations, the Taipei 
authorities cannot but be put on the defensive: on the long run, Taipei’s mainland policy 
appears as an ex post legalization of the breaches opened by firms, and government 
regulations are always lagging far behind the current situation. Therefore, in terms of 
Taiwan’s governmentality, the Taishang cannot but be considered as “illegal migrants”. At 
the very best, their move on the mainland is treated in a condescending way by the authorities 
as testified, among others, by the book published in November 2006 by the Mainland Affairs 
Council Know Thyself, Know Others: The Neglected Risks of China, and the foreword by its 
then chairman, Jaushieh Joseph Wu: 
 
“A priority task of the government is to estimate and warn the public 
of potential risks. The government must be in a position to counter 
changes through advance collection of information and planning of 
preventive measures and, thereby, help its people take precaution 
against risks and avoid damage.”  
“The media has painted a picture of bright prospects and infinite 
potential for China. News reports have created widespread impression 
among Taiwanese people that China is a rapidly developing economy 
whose cheap labor and use of a common language make it an ideal 
place for investment, travel, tourism and immigration. Over 3.5 
million people from Taiwan visit China each year for trade, travel or 
residence purposes. However, many risks exist in the business 
environment. Medical treatment is unreliable, pollution is severe, 
accidents frequently occur, tourists’ safety is generally overlooked, 
and social stability remains uncertain. These factors pose threats to the 
safety of Taiwanese people in China.” 
(…) Psychologically, [the contributors to this book] also make people 
aware of the hardships involved, thereby preventing unnecessary loss 
of life and property that may result from misjudgment and 
misunderstanding of the social and economic situations in China.” 
 
 But, as many highly industrialized countries, Taiwan has also become a land of 
foreign labor immigration. Taiwan became one of the major labor-receiving countries in Asia 
in the mid-1980s, and in May 1992 the government ratified the Employment Service Law 
which stipulates that foreigners can be employed in nine categories of work, the first six being 
white-collar occupations, the last three being unskilled (such as domestics, caregivers, and 
laborers working in the construction and manufacturing industries) for which only laborers 
from the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and more recently Vietnam are eligible 
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for employment57. It can be said that foreigners working in Taiwan in the first six categories 
is not a new phenomena (coming from Japan, North America, or Europe), while it is only 
since the mid-1980s that foreigners have compensated a shortage of unskilled workers in 
Taiwan. And it so happens that the expansion of foreign laborers from Southeast Asia was 
concomitant with the emerging or the term “foreign labor” (wailao), with foreign labor 
gradually being constructed, within a process of othering, as a social problem58. Here, we 
have, I would say, a classical pattern (that is already at work elsewhere, particularly in 
Europe). In Cheng’s words: 
 
“Foreign workers of these nationalities are considered rationally are 
considered racially and culturally different, and this produces an 
implicit association of skill, nationality, and race. 
“Taiwan’s foreign labor policy reflects the state’s anxiety over a 
changing ethnoscape within its national boundaries and reveals its 
deep-seated concern over the development of national identity (…) 
They are supposed to be deported if they become pregnant and/or five 
birth to a child. In other words, the exclusion of foreign labor from 
permanent settlement has been crucial to state control. 
“The treatment of wailao, as opposed to other categories of foreigners, 
is particularly intrusive. The monitoring and surveillance of both their 
bodies and their emotions are integral to the state’s attempt to police 
national borders and ultimately to control the racial/ethnic 
composition of its citizenry.”59
 
While Balibar, for his part, states: 
 
“Since the establishment of a notion of ‘European citizenship”, 
individuals from the member states are no longer ‘full foreigners’ or 
‘fully strange’ to one another in the sense in which individuals from 
‘third’ states (in particular ‘extra-communitarian residents’) are 
strange to them. But of course, the category of the ‘thirds’ is also split, 
because all the places of the world are not equivalent from a European 
(or an American…) point of view, in terms of security, economic 
partnership, cultural difference, etc. We could push to the extreme this 
idea that the status of borders determines the condition of the 
                                                 
57 See Jorge V. Tigno and Maria Ela L. Atienza, International Labor Migration and the Prospects for Regional 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Southeast Asian Migrants in Taiwan, Manila, Institute for Strategic and 
Development Studies, 1998, and Shu-ju Ada Cheng, “Rethinking the Globalization of Domestic Service: Foreign 
Domestics, State Control, and the Politics of Identity in Taiwan”, Gender and Society, vol. 17, n° 2, April 2003, 
pp. 166-186.  
 
58 Cheng, “Rethinking the Globalization of Domestic Service…”, art. cit. 
 
59 Ibid., pp. 173 and 174. 
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stranger/foreigner and the very meaning of ‘being foreign’, rather than 
the reverse: virtually, this category is dissolved, there are no longer 
any ‘foreigners’ in a simple legal sense, because some are 
‘assimilated’ – they are less than foreign, no longer really ‘strange’, 
instead they become ‘neighbors’ – while others are ‘dissimilated’ – 
they are more than foreign, as it were, they become ‘absolutely 
strange’ or ‘aliens’. As a consequence, inevitably, the category of the 
‘national’ (or the self, of what it requires to be the same) also becomes 
split and subject to the dissolving action of ‘internal borders’ which 
mirror the global inequalities.”60
 
 Yet, if one brings into the picture the (mainland) Chinese laborers in Taiwan, the 
process at work is being, once more, inverted. Thus, though Chinese are still not considered as 
eligible for employment, it is secret to nobody that many Chinese women are employed in 
Taiwan, especially as caregivers for elderly men. But as workers they are illegal, so their 
“importation” is made through roundabout means such as marriage. Marriage bureaus are thus 
more or less manpower agencies. In short, the less strange foreign laborer is not the one taken 
into account by the law.  
 
 In other words, and to go back to the over-lapping folds pattern, the process at work in 
Taiwan’s nation-state building process in a context of globalization is the reverse of that 
taking place in other regions of the world, precisely because of the Sino-Taiwanese dispute 
and the non recognition of the Sino-Taiwanese border as an international border. While the 
“de-sinisation” process at work in the building of Taiwan’s national identity implies the 
promotion of a hybrid Taiwanese culture made of over-lapping folds – Chineseness is not the 
“middle”, rather it is one of the “assembled peripheries” -, growing cross-straits exchanges 
brings back Chinese as the less strange other in Taiwan, though, for security reasons, still left 
aside by immigration rules.  
 
° ° ° 
 
 There certainly are other ways of assessing Taiwan’s non-recognized borders. One 
main question that has not been tackled here is of course the impediment such a predicament 
causes to Taiwan’s polity. It then occurs that the latter is over-determined by the status issue, 
that no political debate is free from the “national” issue, that is Taiwan’s ultimate national 
                                                 
60 Balibar, “Europe as Borderland”, paper cited, p. 29 (135 and 136). Emphasis in the original. 
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identity and Taiwan’s future ties with China. In other words, it leads to tackle the Sino-
Taiwanese relationship in terms of a hegemonic relationship61. Yet, grasped as an “other 
space” that mirrors the world society, Taiwan and its non-recognized borders also gives us 
precious indications on contemporary international practices: even if a detour by a logic of 
pretence is necessary, the rule of the game is still the Westphalian fiction; globalization 
processes do not lead to uniformity and equality but to highly hierachized relationships.  
 
                                                 
61 See Françoise Mengin, “De la concurrence des régimes de domination hégémonique sur l’île de Taiwan, à la 
reconduction des modes d’accommodement à la sujétion impériale”, in Jean-François Bayart (ed.), Legs colonial 
et gouvernance contemporaine, vol. II, Paris, FASOPO, multigr., pp. 67-117, available at : 
http://www.fasopo.org/publications/legscolonial2_fm_1206.pdf 
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